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Classically, the main ontological attempts at understanding quantum 
mechanics focus on the corpuscular behavior of these systems and 
especially on detection events, since these are the most classical phenomena 
that we have in such a context (indeed, they also require the presence of a 
classical apparatus). The main trend has been to consider wave-like aspects 
as deprived of ontological substrate and as reflecting rather the 
mathematical abstract formalism of the theory. The few attempts that have 
been done in order to assign some form of ontological reference to wave-
like aspects have tried to interpreted this in terms of classical waves and 
have been disproved across the last 30 years (see Auletta & Tarozzi, 2004b; 
Auletta & Torcal, 2011).  
It is perhaps time to try a different approach, by renouncing any attempt 
at a classical ontology and by taking seriously into account the non-local 
aspects of the theory (which are mostly associated with wave-like 
phenomena). When we consider things in this perspective, we shall discover 
that all non-local phenomena in quantum mechanics, although different, 
have something in common: they all rely on non-local interdependencies 
among possible events or measurement outcomes (see Auletta, 2011). This 
is true for all interference phenomena for isolated systems, this is true for 
entangled systems, this is true for the Aharonov-Bohm effect, and so on. 
What is sad is that we do not have until now a name for denoting this 
mysterious reality. It is indeed mysterious, since we cannot directly measure 
it. There is in fact no way to have a direct experimental evidence of it. In 
most cases we can only reconstruct the interference profile after many 
experimental runs, a circumstance that has led many scientists to discard 















experiment (Auletta & Tarozzi, 2004a) shows that this is not necessarily the 
case.  
Nevertheless, although very mysterious, these interdependencies 
display certain effects. Let us consider the following example: suppose that 
the state of two particles is a singlet state (an instance of entanglement: see 
Auletta et al., 2009, Ch. 16). In such a case, they show a spin-correlation 
such that when one of the two particles is found to be in a spin-up state 
along an experimentally chosen direction, the other one will be necessarily 
in a spin-down state along the same direction or vice versa (that is, if the 
former is found in a spin-down state, the other one will be in a spin-up 
state). In other words, we expect to obtain either up-down or down-up but 
never up-up or down-down. If the world consisted of random events only, 
we would expect to obtain one of these four possible outcomes with 
equiprobability. The fact that we can obtain only two (either up-down or 
down-up) out of four cases represents a reduction of the space of possible 
events. In other words, quantum-mechanical correlations act as constraints 
limiting the space of the events that we can obtain (and therefore also the 
space of possible measurement outcomes). Now, it is bizarre to admit that 
something can have such effect without being somehow a reality.  
Since a specific term for denoting this kind of reality does not exist (but 
neither a satisfactory theory) I shall use the term features (Auletta & Torcal, 
2011) meaning two different things simultaneously:  
 These factors are characters of quantum state that have noticeable and 
experimental consequences. Although they cannot be ascertained in 
themselves, we can be sure of their presence when for instance we 
compare the statistics of the systems in entanglement. If the results 
show the kind of reduction of the space of possible events that I have 
mentioned, we can infer that they are in fact present.  
 However, I avoid the term property since properties are by definition 
local, while I have stressed that features manifest themselves precisely 
in non-local phenomena.  
However, we need also to take seriously in account that we cannot do a 
direct experience with these features. It is a little like for the Kantian 
noumenon. If I am allowed to draw this analogy further, I can say that a 
correct ontology can only be a kind of phenomenal one, that, is an ontology 
that is always interpreted in the framework of a certain theory. On the 
contrary, the primary reality is in itself a piece of uninterpreted ontology. 
This might be true of features, but what is the situation for events? They 















and uninterpreted ontology seems not very insightful for dealing with our 
problem. I will certainly not deny that there is indeed an ontological 
difference between events (which by definition are localized in space and 
time) and features (which by definition are delocalized). However, there is a 
commonality that is much stronger than this difference.  
We take for granted that detection events mean property-attribution to 
quantum systems. In fact, if a detector clicks, we can say e.g. that a particle 
is located in a certain region of the space. However, what we forget here is 
that we are allowed to make such an attribution only because the measured 
system has previously interacted with an apparatus (the so-called 
premeasurement: see Auletta et al., 2009, Ch. 9) in such a way that, if a 
detector clicks, the established connection between object system and 
apparatus allows us to infer which property we may assign to the system in 
this experimental set up. Moreover, we can do this only because there is a 
theory (namely quantum mechanics) that describes this dynamics and 
therefore provides us with the formal or mathematical means to perform 
such an inference. In other words, we assign a property only in the 
framework of both an experimental context and a theory. Therefore, a 
property is a piece of interpreted ontology: one of the major worries about 
classical mechanics is to have misunderstood this point and to have taken 
properties as primary ontology beyond any interpretation. However, an 
event is a piece of uninterpreted ontology: an event only happens or occurs 
and tells nothing about anything else. In order to do this, we need the 
mentioned framework.  
Therefore both events and features are pieces of uninterpreted ontology. 
However, events have properties as interpreted counterpart. Which is the 
interpreted counterpart of features? Only this would fully justify our 
parallelism between events and features. I must admit that it is not so 
straight to find an interpreted counterpart to features (here, their specificity 
is manifest). However, I have mentioned the necessity of an experimental 
context in order to be able to assign properties. If we analyze such a process 
with more care, we shall see that it has three main fundamental stages: 
1) We prepare a system in a certain state. A preparation can be understood 
as a determination of the state of a single system. It is the procedure 
through which only systems in a certain (previously theoretically 
defined) state are selected and delivered for further procedures, that is, 
allowed to undergo subsequent operations (premeasurement and 















2) Then we select a certain observable (like position or energy) to be 
measured. This step is called premeasurement. It consists in an 
interrogation of a quantum system relative to a specific degree of 
freedom. Indeed, not all experimental contexts are adequate to measure 
a certain observable, and this allows us to define an observable as an 
equivalence class of premeasurements.  
3) Finally, a detection or measurement in a strict sense is an answer to our 
interrogation of the object system. Therefore, we can say that a property 
is an equivalence class of detections (many different detections can lead 
to the same property attribution).  
Events occur in the third step, whilst features are constitutive of the 
state as it is prepared in the first step. The second step is somehow the 
dynamical bridge initial and final procedure (it us indeed in this stage that 
system and apparatus interact). Then, we can say that properties are 
attributed thanks to detection events, that is, to events that happen in a 
specific experimental framework. On the other hand, features are inferred 
thanks to the effects that a system in a certain state has on the subsequent 
steps. Therefore, the whole of the experimental procedure (consisting in 
preparation, premeasurement and detection) is a sort of operational bridge 
between uninterpreted and interpreted ontology (it is here that the Kantian 
framework is no longer helpful but we need to shift to a operationalist 
philosophy). It is what ensures this distinction but also the connection 
between these two ontologies (and therefore also justifies the term 
uninterpreted ontology). In this way, events and features on the one hand, 
and detections and preparations on the other can be taken to really be part of 
the two mentioned ontologies.  
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